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Introduction
The last decades have witnessed tremendous pressure on poor developing countries to liberalise their trade. The free trade mantra preached by developed countries and major international development organisations has become like a religion, holding out the promise that if poor countries adopt the faith, they will somehow be 'saved'. The broad purpose of this paper is to challenge this simplistic view. The paper is based on a review of the vast literature of theory and case studies (including research of our own) on the relation between trade liberalisation and economic performance across the world (see Thirlwall and Pacheco-López, 2008) , which leads us to four general, but important, conclusions. The first is that while there can be static gains from trade (if certain crucial assumptions are met) there is nothing in the theory of trade per se which demonstrates conclusively that trade liberalisation will launch a country on a higher sustainable growth path. Even Jagdish Bhagwati (2001) , the high priest of free trade, is honest about that (see below). Secondly, the impact of trade liberalisation on reducing world poverty has been minimal, and may have increased it. Thirdly, trade liberalisation has almost certainly worsened the relative distribution of income between rich and poor countries, and between unskilled wage-earners and other workers within countries, contrary to the predictions of orthodox theory. Finally, the evidence is fragile that the economic growth performance of countries that have liberalised extensively is in any way superior to countries that have not. The timing, sequencing and context of liberalisation are of prime importance in determining the impact of liberalisation. What really matters for growth performance is domestic economic policy and growth-supportive institutions. This will lead us at the end of the paper to a brief discussion of trade strategy for development.
What is Wrong with Orthodox Trade Theory?
Orthodox trade theory is based on Ricardo's (1817) law of comparative advantage, and the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem which argues that countries will gain by specialising in the production of goods which use their most abundant factor of production (Heckscher, 1919; Ohlin, 1933) . Paul Samuelson (1962) cites Ricardo's theory of comparative advantage as one of the few laws in economics 'that is both true and non-trivial'. There are, indeed, static welfare gains to be had by countries specialising in goods in which they have the greatest comparative advantage (or lowest opportunity cost), but two crucial, often-forgotten, assumptions need to be met.
The first is that in the process of resource reallocation, full employment is preserved, but this is not guaranteed. If unemployment arises, the welfare gains from greater specialisation may be offset by the welfare losses of unemployment. As Keynes (1930) rightly says 'free trade assumes that if you throw men out of work in one direction you re-employ them in another. As soon as this link in the chain is broken the whole of the free trade argument breaks down'. The second crucial assumption is that in the process of freeing trade, balance of payments equilibrium is preserved, which is also not guaranteed. In orthodox theory, the balance of payments is assumed to look after itself without affecting output and employment. This was the implicit assumption of the gold standard adjustment mechanism, and is also implicit in the theory of flexible exchange rates. But if trade liberalisation leads to a faster growth of imports than exports and the nominal exchange rate is not an efficient balance of payments adjustment weapon, then output will need to contract to reduce imports, leading to welfare losses. As we shall see later, this has been the experience of many developing countries forced to liberalise prematurely.
In fact, the existence of unemployment provides one of the major economic arguments for protection, as outlined in Johnson's (1964) classic paper on tariffs and economic development. Unemployment means that the social cost of labour is less than the private cost so that a welfare gain is possible by encouraging more domestic employment until the social cost of production is equal to the world price of goods. A subsidy to labour, however, is the first best policy because an equivalent tariff would reduce consumer surplus. Johnson also outlines some of the other classic economic arguments for protection such as the infant industry argument; the externalities argument, and the optimal tariff argument. But Rodrik (1988) is correct that despite the body of trade theory which legitimises protection, the arguments have still not penetrated the vast literature on trade policy in developing countries even though the market imperfections that the arguments reflect are more serious in developing countries than in developed countries.
As well as potential static gains from trade (although not guaranteed, and in any case small (see Dowrick, 1997) ) there are also possible dynamic gains which arise through the greater flow of ideas, new knowledge, investment and economies of scale if the domestic market for output is small. The dynamic effects of trade, however, depend primarily on what countries specialise in; whether natural resource activities or manufacturing. John Stuart Mill (1848) pointed this out in the 19 th century, and Stiglitz (2006) today makes the same enduring point:
Without protection, a country whose static comparative advantage lies in, say agriculture, risks stagnation; its comparative advantage will remain in agriculture, with limited growth prospects. Broad-based industrial protection can lead to an increase in the size of the industrial sector which is, almost everywhere, the source of innovation; many of these advances spill over into the rest of the economy as do the benefits from the development of institutions, like financial markets, that accompany the growth of an industrial sector. Moreover, a large and growing industrial sector (and the tariffs on manufactured goods) provide revenues with which the government can fund education, infrastructure, and other ingredients for broad-based growth.
In other words, if trade is to be an engine of growth, poor countries need to acquire new comparative advantage in goods that have favourable production and demand characteristics. Structure matters for economic growth. This is recognised in 'new' trade theory pioneered by Krugman (1984 Krugman ( , 1986 in the 1980s, who shows there is a case for protecting industries with spillovers and externalities, and for using import substitution for export promotion. In most standard growth models, however, the effect of trade on growth is ambiguous. For example, in the canonical neoclassical Solow model (1956) , trade cannot affect the steady-state growth rate, because it is treated as an exogenous constant. Only in the 'new' growth theories of, for example, Helpman (1991a, 1991b) does trade have the potential to raise the growth rate permanently through learning and spillover effects, but they have to be continuous. Bhagwati (2001) , the most ardent advocate of free trade, even for poor developing countries, frankly admits:
Those who assert that free trade will ---lead necessarily to greater growth either are ignorant of the fine nuances of the theory and the vast quantity of literature to the contrary on the subject at hand or are nonetheless basing their argument on a different premise; that is, that the preponderant evidence on the issue (in the post-war period)
suggests that free trade tends to lead to greater growth after all. In fact, where theory includes several models that can lead in different directions, the policy economist is challenged to choose the model that is most appropriate to the reality she confronts. And I would argue that, in the present instance, we must choose the approach that generates favourable outcomes for growth when trade is liberalised. Were the Americans, either by combination or by any other sort of violence, to stop the importation to European manufactures, and, by thus giving a monopoly to such of their own countrymen as could manufacture the like goods, divert any considerable part of their capital into this employment, they would retard instead of accelerating the further increase in the value of their annual produce, and would obstruct instead of promoting the progress of their country towards real wealth and greatness.
If the United States had followed Smith's advice, it would have remained an economic backwater instead of becoming the richest country in the world based on high productivity in industry. The same can be said of modern-day economic giants, such as Japan and South Korea, whose comparative advantage once lay in rice, but who, through selective protection, import substitution, export promotion and directed credit, transformed themselves into industrial power-houses (see Chang, 2005) . The newly industrialising countries of South-East Asia, and particularly China, are pursuing the same route to development; transforming their industrial structure through deliberate policy intervention, and are growing fast as a consequence. Stiglitz (2006) is right when he says that 'economists who promise that trade liberalisation will make everybody better off are being disingenuous. Economic theory (and historical experience) suggests the contrary'. All we know is that as countries get richer they dismantle trade restrictions, not that they get richer because they liberalise trade. The issue for poor developing countries today is not whether to protect, but how to protect in order to ensure the dynamic efficiency of their nascent industrial activities.
Poverty and Income Inequality within Countries
At this moment in time, nearly one billion of the world's population live on less than $1 a day, and 2.7 billion live on less than $2 a day (Chen and Ravallion, 2004) . In other words, over one-third of the world's population lives in absolute poverty.
Advocates of trade liberalisation promise that the freeing of trade will lift people out of poverty. The former European Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, wrote in
The Guardian newspaper (3 rd October 2008) that globalisation is the greatest engine of poverty reduction the world has ever seen. If he had looked at the facts, however, he would see that since 1980 the absolute number of people in poverty has not decreased. The number on less than $2 a day has increased from 2.4 billion to 2.7 billion, and the number on less than $1 a day (excluding China) has increased from 848 million to 870 million. The reduction in the total numbers living on less than $1 a day is because of a fall in China in the early 1980s, but this was due to agricultural reforms not to trade liberalisation (Milanovic, 2005b) . Winters et al. (2004) For example, controlling for initial conditions makes the relation insignificant, and adding other control variables makes no difference. Ravallion concludes 'it remains clear that there is considerable variation in the rates of poverty reduction at a given rate of expansion of trade volume'. Equally, however, 'based on the data available from cross-country comparisons, it is hard to maintain the view that expanding trade, in general, is a powerful force for poverty reduction in developing countries'.
At the same time as the absolute numbers in poverty have been increasing, the distribution of income within poor countries has also been widening, contrary to the orthodox predictions of the Hecksher-Ohlin (and Stolper-Samuelson, 1941) theorems. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) , in their survey of the distributional effects of globalisation in developing countries, say: 'while inequality has many different dimensions, all existing measures for inequality in developing countries seem to point to an increase in inequality which in some cases is severe'. The major cause of income inequality is wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers.
Orthodox trade theory predicts a narrowing of wage inequality in poor countries because their comparative advantage should lie in the production and export of goods using abundant unskilled labour. This narrowing has not happened for four main reasons: first, trade-related, skill-biased technical change; secondly, competition between poor countries; thirdly, flows of foreign direct investment adding to the demand for skilled labour, and finally in some cases, depressed demand for unskilled labour where trade liberalisation has caused balance of payments difficulties (see Arbache et al. 2004 for a case study of Brazil).
By far the most detailed study of the impact of trade liberalisation on the distribution of income is that by Milanovic (2005a) . First, in his introductory survey of the existing literature, he remarks:
The conclusions run nearly the full gamut, from openness reducing the real income of the poor to openness raising the income of the poor proportionately less than the income of the rich to raising both the same in relative terms. Note, however, that there are no results that show openness reducing inequality; that is, raising the income of the poor more than the income of the rich -let alone raising the absolute income of the poor by more.
Milanovic's own research takes 321 household surveys from 95 countries in 1988, and 113 countries in 1993 and 1998 covering 90 percent of the world's population.
Income inequality is measured, not by a summary statistic such as the Gini ratio or Theil index, but by the income of the ith decile of the population relative to the mean level of income of the whole population. For each decile, income inequality is then related to trade openness measured by the ratio of total trade to GDP, and also to openness interacted with the level of income to test whether the effect of openness on inequality varies with the level of income. A regression is run for each of the ten deciles using the same independent variables. Two striking results emerge. Firstly, increased openness reduces the income share of the bottom six deciles. Secondly, the adverse effect of openness on inequality is less the higher a country's per capita income. The turning point for the poor to benefit from increased trade is approximately US$7,500 at 1990 prices. Barro (2000) and Spilimbergo et al. (1999) also find openness worsens income inequality up to a certain point and then the effect diminishes. Milanovic concludes: 'openness would therefore seem to have a particularly negative impact on poor and middle income groups in poor countriesdirectly opposite to what would be expected from the standard Hecksher-Ohlin-
The contrary conclusion to the above studies of Dollar and Kraay (2002, 2004 ) that 'growth is good for the poor' arises from their unusual procedure of measuring trade in nominal US dollars, but measuring GDP at purchasing power parity (PPP). Since GDP at PPP is much higher than in nominal dollars, this considerably understates the ratio of trade to GDP in poor countries. For example, China's exports as a share of GDP measured at PPP are only 7 per cent compared to 26 per cent if both trade and GDP are measured in nominal dollars. It is this latter ratio that affects the income distribution, and which should be used in studies of trade and income distribution.
International and Global Inequality
Not only has the distribution of income within poor countries been increasing over time, but also the distribution of income between poor and rich countries. Again, this contradicts the prediction of orthodox neoclassical theory (Solow, 1956 ) which argues that because the productivity of capital should be higher in poor capital-scarce countries than in rich capital-saturated countries, poor countries should grow faster than the rich leading to a convergence of living standards across the world. There are many non-orthodox models to explain divergence, associated with the names of Myrdal (1957) , Hirschman (1958) , Kaldor (1970) and various Marxist writers, but nonetheless the orthodoxy prevails despite the evidence.
The measurement of international inequality takes each country's average per capita income as a single unit, regardless of the distribution of income within countries, and a Gini ratio can be calculated either unweighted or weighted by population. Global inequality, by contrast, not only measures inequality between countries but also within countries as well, giving a higher figure. The most recent calculations of the Gini ratio of international inequality by Milanovic (2005b) , and of global inequality by Milanovic (2005b) , Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002) and Sala-i-Martin (2002) are shown in Table 1 . The unweighted Gini ratio for international inequality shows a steady historical rise from 1820, and also in the post-war period of trade liberalisation from 1952. The population-weighted Gini ratio of international inequality shows a slight decline in recent years due to the fast growth of populous countries such as China and India. If China is taken from the sample, the population-weighted Gini ratio is also shown to rise. The Gini ratio for global inequality has increased over time but has been relatively static in recent years because while between-country inequality (population-weighted) has fallen slightly, income inequality within countries has increased, particularly in China between the rural and urban sectors. 
Trade Liberalisation and Trade Performance
The main purpose of trade liberalisation is to promote, or allow, the most efficient allocation of a country's resources to maximise its welfare. 
where x is the growth of export volume; rer is the rate of change of the real exchange rate; z is the growth of world income; d x is the duty on exports; lib is the liberalisation dummy, and t is time. Depending on the estimation technique used, the central estimate is that trade liberalisation has raised export growth by approximately two percentage points, or by one-quarter compared to the pre-liberalisation export growth rate. The estimated coefficient on the export duty variable is negative, but small (roughly -0.2). The coefficient on the liberalisation dummy variable is consistently in the range 1-2 taking the full sample of 22 countries, but the quantitative effect (shown in brackets) differs between the four regions: Africa (3.58); South Asia (2.54); East Asia (2.42), and Latin America (1.66).
For a country's overall economic performance to improve, however, it is not enough for export growth to accelerate. Export growth must be shown to outpace import growth, otherwise balance of payments difficulties will arise. In the literature on trade liberalisation, very little attention has been paid to import growth, or to the balance between export growth and import growth. This is a serious weakness of trade liberalisation studies, but is a reflection of the fact that in orthodox trade and growth theory the balance of payments is either assumed to look after itself, or deficits are regarded as a form of consumption smoothing and have no long run effect on real variables. Country studies by Melo and Vogt (1984) for Venezuela; Mah (1999) for Thailand, and Bertola and Faini (1991) for Morocco all show a significant impact of trade liberalisation on import growth and on the sensitivity of imports to domestic income growth, but the most detailed study is that by Santos-Paulino and Thirlwall 
The results may be summarised as follows. If trade liberalisation raises the growth of imports by more than exports, or raises the income elasticity of demand for imports by more than in proportion to the growth of exports, the balance of trade (or payments) will worsen at a given growth of output, unless the currency can be manipulated to raise the value of exports relative to imports. Surprisingly, very little research has been done on the balance of payments effect of trade liberalisation. The first major studies were by Parikh for UNCTAD (1999) and for WIDER (Parikh, 2002 
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where TB/GDP is the trade balance to GDP ratio, and BP/GDP is the balance of payments to GDP ratio; tt is the terms of trade, and the other variables are as defined in equations (1) Indeed, the ultimate test of successful trade liberalisation, at least at the macro-level without regard to distributional effects, is whether it lifts a country onto a higher growth path consistent with a sustainable balance of payments; or, in other words, whether it improves the trade-off between growth and the balance of payments, as illustrated in Figure 1 . The curve is drawn to represent a serious situation where the balance of payments is in deficit (point a) even at zero growth. The objective of trade policy should be to shift the curve upwards, to, say, point b on the horizontal axis so that some positive GDP growth is possible without running into balance of payments difficulties.
We have estimated this trade-off curve (using the trade balance/GDP ratio as the 
(-2.1) (-2.7) (-4.
2)
The pre-liberalisation deficit at zero growth is -1.387, and the post-liberalisation deficit is (-1.387) + (-3.610) = -4.997. Liberalisation has worsened the trade-off by 3.6 percentage points. Controlling for changes in the real exchange rate and world income growth reduces the unfavourable impact to -2.0 p.p., but this is still significant.
Trade Liberalisation and Growth Performance
While it is true that trade liberalisation has improved export performance, liberalisation and export growth are not the same, and should not be confused. As
Stiglitz (2006) notes:
Advocates of liberalisation cite statistical studies claiming that liberalisation enhances growth. But a careful look at the evidence shows something quite different… It is exports -not the removal of trade barriers-that is the driving force of growth. Studies that focus directly on the removal of trade barriers show little relationship between liberalisation and growth. The advocates of quick liberalisation tried an intellectual sleight of hand, hoping that the broad-brush discussion of the benefits of globalisation would suffice to make their case.
Our study of Latin America discussed above is the only one we know that examines the impact of liberalisation on the trade-off between growth and the balance of payments, but there are several time series and cross section studies of the relation between liberalisation and GDP growth on the one hand and trade openness and GDP growth on the other (although trade openness is not the same as liberalisation). The studies give mixed results, but it can definitely be said that the extravagant claims of the pro-trade liberalisers look hollow when compared with the evidence. Early work by Edwards (1992 Edwards ( , 1998 and Dollar (1992) showing a positive relation between openness (or the outward orientation of countries) and growth performance was heavily criticised by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) on methodological grounds and for lack of robustness. Similar work by Dollar and Kraay (2004) on 'globalisation' and economic growth was likewise criticised by Dowrick and Golley (2004) Wacziard and Welch (2008) extend the Sachs-Warner study into the 1990s with more countries, and find that their result is not robust; there appears to be no significant effect of openness on growth performance. Wright (1998, 2002) Deep trade liberalisation cannot be relied upon to deliver high rates of economic growth and therefore does not deserve the high priority it typically receives in the development strategies pushed by leading organisations.
Trade Strategy for Development
So what trade strategy should poor countries pursue? The overriding objective must be to acquire dynamic comparative advantage. For this, the private sector of an economy needs the support of the government in the form of incentives and various types of 'protection' to mitigate investment risks. It is one thing to argue against antiexport bias; it is another to argue that poor countries should abandon all forms of protection of domestic industry. Improved market access to developed countries for poor country exports merely perpetuates static comparative advantage. As Rodrik not to be the ideal policy instruments because they do not discriminate, and earn profits only for those selling in the domestic market. Export subsidies avoid antiexport bias, but still do not discriminate between the innovators and the copycats, and in any case are illegal under the rules of the WTO. The first-best policy is public sector credit or guarantees which can discriminate in favour of the innovator, and be used as a 'stick' if firms do not perform well.
There is much that the international community can also do to promote trade for development, as opposed to pursuing trade liberalisation for its own sake. The whole world trade system works against the majority of poor developing countries, firstly because of their dependence on primary commodities (the 'curse' of natural resources) and low value-added manufactures; secondly because the 'rules of the game' governing trade between rich and poor countries are rigged and biased in favour of the rich, and thirdly because the agenda for trade reform is largely set by the rich developed countries. The only permanent solution to primary-commodity dependence is structural change which requires the establishment of new, nontraditional industries; but this is what the rich developed nations are hostile to. They want free access to poor countries' markets, while continuing to protect their own.
The most recent example of this is the ongoing debate between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries over Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) to replace the trade preferences that the ACP countries used to enjoy under the Lomé Convention. The EU is insisting that poor developing countries reduce restrictions on imports of manufactured goods and service activities in return for continued access to the EU market for their agricultural products. The EU is refusing to look at alternatives to free trade EPAs, but by its own admission it concedes that EPAs could lead to the collapse of the manufacturing sector in many poor countries. As Stiglitz (2006) Raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steady growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of, and trade in, goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means of doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of development
The aim is laudable, but unfortunately there is a divorce between rhetoric and reality because the WTO treats trade liberalisation and economic development as synonymous, and yet as we have seen the historical and contemporary evidence is that domestic economic policy, institution-building and the promotion of investment opportunities are far more important than trade liberalisation and trade openness in determining economic success in the early stages of economic development. Rodrik 
